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 The Pennsylvania Board of Funeral Directors (the 
“Board”) appeals the grant of summary judgment that the 
District Court awarded based upon its conclusion that several 
provisions of Pennsylvania’s Funeral Director Law (“FDL”), 
63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.1 et seq., violate various provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution.  The suit was brought by individuals 
and entities who are either involved in, or wish to be involved 
in, Pennsylvania’s “death care industry.”1  In relevant part, 
the Plaintiffs challenged statutory provisions that:  (1) permit 
warrantless inspections of funeral establishments by the 
Board; (2) limit the number of establishments in which a 
funeral director may possess an ownership interest; (3) 
restrict the capacity of unlicensed individuals and certain 
entities to hold ownership interests in a funeral establishment; 
(4) restrict the number of funeral establishments in which a 
funeral director may practice his or her profession; (5) require 
every funeral establishment to have a licensed full-time 
supervisor; (6) require funeral establishments to have a 
“preparation room”; (7) prohibit the service of food in a 
funeral establishment; (8) prohibit the use of trade names by 
funeral homes; (9) govern the trusting of monies advanced 
pursuant to pre-need contracts for merchandise; and (10) 
prohibit the payment of commissions to agents or employees. 
                                              
1 The Plaintiffs-Appellees are collectively referred to as the “Plaintiffs.” 
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As a threshold matter, we surmise that much of the 
District Court’s conclusions regarding the constitutionality of 
the FDL, enacted in 1952,  stem from a view that certain 
provisions of the FDL are antiquated in light of how funeral 
homes now operate.  That is not, however, a constitutional 
flaw.  Thus, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the 
District Court’s judgment striking down the FDL’s 
warrantless inspection scheme on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.  We also reverse the District Court’s judgments 
concerning the Plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges to certain provisions of the FDL.  We reverse as 
well the District Court’s conclusions that the disputed FDL 
provisions violate the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause.  We also reverse the District Court’s ruling 
that the Board’s actions unconstitutionally impair the 
Plaintiffs’ private contractual relations with third parties in 
violation of the Constitution’s Contract Clause.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s ruling that Pennsylvania’s ban on 
the use of trade names in the funeral industry runs afoul of 
First Amendment protections, but reverse its ruling that the 
ban on the payment of commissions to unlicensed salespeople 
violates the Constitution.  Finally, we remand to the District 
Court to modify its order in accordance with this opinion. 
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
 The FDL was enacted in 1952 to “provide for the 
better protection of life and health of the citizens of 
[Pennsylvania] by requiring and regulating the examination, 
licensure and registration of persons and registration of 
corporations engaging in the care, preparation and disposition 
of the bodies of deceased persons . . . .”  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
479.1.  The FDL created the Board, it entrusts the Board with 
enforcing the FDL, and “empower[s] [it] to formulate 
necessary rules and regulations not inconsistent with [the 
FDL] for the proper conduct of the business or profession of 
funeral directing and as may be deemed necessary or proper 
to safeguard the interests of the public and the standards of 
the profession.”  Id. § 479.16(a); see also id. § 479.19. 
  
The FDL requires individuals to obtain a license to be 
a funeral director or own funeral homes in Pennsylvania.2  Id. 
§ 479.13(a).  Generally, only licensed funeral directors or 
partnerships of two or more licensed funeral directors may 
own funeral homes.  Id. § 479.8(a).  The statute also restricts 
the types of individuals and entities that may obtain such 
licenses.  However, upon the death of a licensee, the FDL 
authorizes the Board to issue a license to the licensee’s estate 
                                              
2 The FDL defines “funeral director” as 
 includ[ing] any person engaged in the 
profession of a funeral director or in the care 
and disposition of the human dead, or in the 
practice of disinfecting and preparing by 
embalming the human dead for the funeral 
service, burial or cremation, or the 
supervising of the burial, transportation or 
disposal of deceased human bodies, or in the 
practice of funeral directing or embalming 
as presently known, whether under these 
titles or designation or otherwise.  The term 
“funeral director” shall also mean a person 
who makes arrangements for funeral service 
and who sells funeral merchandise to the 
public incidental to such service or who 
makes financial arrangements for the 
rendering of such services and the sale of 
such merchandise. 
63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.2(1). 
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for a period of three years or to the licensee’s surviving 
spouse while s/he remains unmarried.  Id.  The statute 
authorizes restricted corporations (“RBCs”) to obtain 
licenses, provided that they are formed for the sole purpose of 
conducting a funeral directing practice.  Id. § 479.8(b).3  The 
FDL prohibits an RBC from having an ownership interest in 
any other funeral establishment and requires that at least one 
of its principal officers be a licensed funeral director.  Id.  
Upon the death of a shareholder funeral director, shares or 
stock of an RBC may be transferred to members of the 
decedent’s immediate family.  Id. 
  
The FDL also codifies Pennsylvania’s prohibition of 
general business corporations owning funeral directing 
licenses.  See id. § 479.8(d).  Prior to 1935, Pennsylvania 
issued funeral directing licenses to individuals as well as 
corporations.  However, in 1935 the General Assembly 
imposed restrictions.  Consistent with a 1936 decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see Rule v. Price, 185 A. 851 
(Pa. 1936), the legislature eventually allowed a total of 
seventy-seven “pre-1935” licenses to be “grandfathered” into 
the new law.  Currently, any person or entity—including 
general business corporations—may own an interest in one of 
these licenses and own and operate a funeral establishment 
pursuant to the authority granted by that license.  
 Licensed funeral directors are limited to operating at 
one principal place of business with no more than one branch 
location.  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.8(e).  These establishments 
must be conducted under the name of a licensed principal or 
that of a predecessor establishment.  Id. §§ 479.8(a)-(c).  In 
addition, the FDL requires that each establishment retain a 
licensed funeral director as a “full-time supervisor,” id., and 
include a “preparation room . . . for the preparation and 
embalming of human bodies,” id. § 479.7.  Food service is 
generally prohibited inside a funeral establishment.  Only 
“non-intoxicating” beverages may be served, and they may 
                                              
3 As defined by § 479.8(b), “[a] restricted business corporation is . . . a 
corporation formed by one or more licensed funeral directors specifically for the 
purpose of conducting a funeral directing practice and whose shareholders are 
licensed funeral directors or members of the immediate family of a licensed 
funeral director.”  H.P. Brandt Funeral Home, Inc. v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, et al. 467 A.2d 106, 107 (Pa. Cmwlth 1983).  
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only be served in rooms “not used for the preparation and 
conduct of [] funeral service[s].”  Id. 
 
 As the administrative entity entrusted with enforcing 
the FDL, the Board’s inspectors are authorized to conduct 
warrantless and unannounced inspections of funeral 
establishments.  Specifically, Section 16(b) of the FDL 
authorizes the Board to appoint inspectors who have: 
[T]he right of entry into any 
place, where the business of 
funeral directing is carried on, or 
advertised as being carried on, for 
the purpose of the inspection and 
for the investigation of complaints 
coming before the board and for 
such other matters as the board 
might direct. 
  
Id. § 479.16(b).  
 
 Finally, the FDL also contains two provisions relating 
to the “pre-need” sale of funeral arrangements that are at 
issue here.4  First, Section 11(a)(8) of the FDL provides that a 
funeral director or funeral home’s license may be suspended 
or revoked if a licensed funeral director pays unlicensed 
employees commissions on sales.  See id. § 479.11(a)(8) 
(“The board . . . may refuse to grant, refuse to renew, suspend 
or revoke a license of any applicant or licensee . . . for . . . (8) 
paying a commission . . . to any person . . . for . . . business 
secured. . . .”).  Second, the FDL requires that a funeral 
director who enters into a pre-need contract to provide funeral 
services deposit 100% of any advance payments into an 
escrow or trust account.  Id. § 479.13(c). 
 
In May 2008, the Plaintiffs initiated this suit against 
the Board, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 
U.S.C. § 2201 for alleged violations of their rights under the 
U.S. Constitution.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint asserted that the above-referenced FDL provisions 
                                              
4 “‘Preneed’ services are what their name implies: a customer makes his or her 
funeral arrangements and pays for them, either in a lump sum or over time with 
the idea that, at the time of death, the services are fully paid for.”  In re Forest 
Hill Funeral Home & Mem’l Park, 364 B.R. 808, 811 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2007). 
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violated several constitutional provisions, including the 
Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause, the First 
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the substantive 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. 
 
By way of stipulation, the parties dismissed one of the 
counts in the amended complaint with prejudice.5  Thereafter, 
the Board and Plaintiffs both moved for summary judgment. 
 
The District Court largely agreed with the Plaintiffs 
that the challenged FDL provisions violated various 
constitutional provisions. See Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. 
Supp. 2d 358 (M.D. Pa. 2012).  The Court struck down FDL 
provisions that: (1) permit warrantless inspections of funeral 
establishments by the Board; (2) limit the number of 
establishments in which a funeral director may possess an 
ownership interest; (3) restrict the capacity of unlicensed 
individuals and certain entities to hold ownership interests in 
a funeral establishment; (4) restrict the number of funeral 
establishments in which a funeral director may practice 
his/her profession; (5) require every funeral establishment to 
have a licensed full-time supervisor; (6) require funeral 
establishments to have a “preparation room”; (7) prohibit the 
service of food in a funeral establishment; (8) prohibit the use 
of trade names by funeral homes; (9) govern the trusting of 
monies advanced pursuant to pre-need contracts for 
merchandise; and (10) prohibit the payment of commissions 
to agents or employees.6 
 
This appeal followed. 
 
                                              
5 The parties agreed to dismiss Count X, which claimed that the Board had 
arbitrarily and unreasonably restricted licensed funeral directors from securing 
continuing education credits online. 
 
6 The District Court found in the Board’s favor on Count XI of the amended 
complaint, which alleged that certain restrictions that the FDL places on 
cremation violated the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Commerce Clause, the First 
Amendment, and the Due Process Clause.  See Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 408-
18.  The Plaintiffs have not appealed the District Court’s ruling on this issue. 
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II. Discussion 
A.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s order 
granting an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).  The 
District Court had federal question jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 
  
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant or denial of summary judgment.  Carter v. McGrady, 
292 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2002).  “To prevail on a motion 
for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate 
that ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  
Interstate Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Twp. of 
Mount Laurel, 706 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  Moreover, “where, as was the case here, 
the District Court considers cross-motions for summary 
judgment ‘the court construes facts and draws inferences in 
favor of the party against whom the motion under 
consideration is made.’”  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pichler 
v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 386 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
B.  Facial versus As-Applied Challenge 
 
Before we proceed to the merits of the Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional claims, we need to address the threshold matter 
of whether we are reviewing a facial or an as-applied 
challenge to the disputed FDL provisions.  The difference 
between the two is significant.  “A party asserting a facial 
challenge ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid.’”  United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).  This is a 
particularly demanding standard and is the “most difficult 
challenge to mount successfully.”  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.  
By contrast, “[a]n as-applied attack . . . does not contend that 
a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a 
particular person under particular circumstances deprived that 
person of a constitutional right.”  United States v. Marcavage, 
609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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In granting summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on all 
but one of their asserted counts, the District Court only 
engaged in a facial analysis.  Confusingly, however, the 
District Court’s subsequent order invalidated those same FDL 
provisions both on their face and as-applied to the Plaintiffs. 
 
When confronted with this kind of ambiguity in the 
past, our inquiry has examined whether the challenged 
statutes survive either type of challenge.  See Mitchell, 652 
F.3d at 405-06; Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273.  However, in 
those cases, the parties themselves disputed the nature of the 
challenges.  Here, the amended complaint is generally 
consistent with a facial challenge and Plaintiffs’ briefs 
exclusively advance facial challenges. This is consistent with 
the position Plaintiffs’ counsel took at oral argument.  On 
appeal, counsel relies on several grounds in continuing to 
argue that the FDL is invalid on its face.  Accordingly, we 
will limit our inquiry to whether the challenged provisions of 
the FDL are facially invalid.7 
C.  Fourth Amendment 
  
Section 16(b) of the FDL gives board inspectors “the 
right of entry into any place, where the business or profession 
of funeral directing is carried on or advertised as being 
carried on, for the purpose of inspection and for the 
investigation of complaints coming before the board and such 
other matters as the board may direct.”  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 479.16(b).  Count I of the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint 
charged that this authority to conduct warrantless searches of 
funeral establishments violates the Fourth Amendment. 
  
The Supreme Court has recognized that “warrantless 
searches are generally unreasonable, and [] this rule applies to 
commercial premises as well as homes.”  Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978).  Therefore, the 
                                              
7 As noted above, a finding that the FDL’s provisions are facially invalid negates 
any need to conduct an as-applied challenge.  See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.  If 
the FDL is determined to be unconstitutional as written, it is irrelevant whether 
the statute’s application to a particular person under particular circumstances 
deprived that person of a constitutional right.  See Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273.  
Moreover, given the arguments asserted by Plaintiffs and the record before us, 
we conclude that an “as applied challenge” is not supported by this record.  
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government must secure a warrant before searching or 
inspecting private premises absent certain narrow 
circumstances that are not alleged here.  Showers v. Spangler, 
182 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 1999).  The Board defends its 
authority to conduct warrantless searches by relying on the 
“well recognized exception” to the warrant requirement that 
applies to highly regulated industries.  See id.; see also Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 544 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“Certain industries have such a history of 
government oversight that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy could exist.”).   
  
In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Supreme Court 
rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a New York statute that authorized 
warrantless inspections of vehicle- dismantling businesses.  The Court reasoned 
that the authority to inspect such businesses without a warrant came within the 
narrow exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of 
closely regulated businesses.  Id. at 703.  The state had a substantial interest in 
regulating industries associated with motor vehicle theft, and warrantless 
administrative inspections advanced that interest.  Id. at 708.  The Court held 
that the challenged statute provided a “constitutionally adequate substitute” for 
warrants by informing operators of a vehicle-dismantling business that 
inspections will be made on a regular basis and by limiting discretion of 
inspection officers.  Id. at 711. 
  
Accordingly, we begin our Fourth Amendment inquiry 
by determining whether the FDL is a “closely regulated 
industry.”  Free Speech Coal., Inc., 677 F.3d at 544. “Factors 
to consider when determining whether a particular industry is 
closely regulated include: duration of the regulation’s 
existence, pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, and 
regularity of the regulation’s application.”  Id. 
  
The funeral “industry” in Pennsylvania is clearly 
subjected to extensive regulations.8  The FDL and its 
supporting regulations prescribe a broad range of standards 
that funeral directors in Pennsylvania have long been required 
to comply with. These include licensing requirements, health 
standards, and funeral services that funeral homes must 
provide.  See, e.g., 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 479.6 (issuance of 
licenses), 479.7 (health restrictions); see also Guardian Plans 
v. Teague, 870 F.2d 123, 126 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing 
                                              
8 Indeed, one need look no further than the breadth of the regulations being 
challenged by the Plaintiffs to understand the breadth of Pennsylvania’s 
regulations of the funeral industry. 
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similar requirements governing funeral service professionals 
in Virginia as “extensive”); Toms v. Bureau of Prof’l and 
Occupational Affairs, 800 A.2d 342, 349 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) 
(“The [FDL] . . . impose[s] rules and restrictions on funeral 
directors not only to protect the bereaved . . . , but also to 
provide a framework with which to help the bereaved address 
each of the issues that arise when making final arrangements 
for a deceased loved one.”).  The funeral industry is also 
subject to significant federal regulation.  Not only does the 
Federal Trade Commission require funeral homes to disclose 
pricing information prior to all transactions, see 16 C.F.R. 
453.2, funeral establishments must also comply with several 
health and safety standards imposed by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 
1910.1030 (Blood borne Pathogen Standard). 
  
Since we have no difficulty concluding that 
Pennsylvania’s funeral industry is a “closely regulated 
industry,” our Burger inquiry proceeds to determining if the 
searches authorized by the FDL are reasonable.  Free Speech 
Coal., Inc., 677 F.3d at 544 (“Once a business is determined 
to be part of a closely regulated industry, then we must decide 
whether the alleged warrantless search was reasonable.”).  
That inquiry requires us to focus on three criteria: 
First, there must be a substantial 
government interest that informs 
the regulatory scheme pursuant to 
which the inspection is made. . . .  
Second, the warrantless 
inspections must be necessary to 
further the regulatory scheme. . . .  
Finally, the statute’s inspection 
program . . . must provide a 
constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant. 
 
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); Free Speech Coal., Inc., 677 F.3d at 544.  
 
The Plaintiffs argue that the searches authorized by the 
FDL are not supported by a sufficient governmental interest 
to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny under Burger.  
However, Pennsylvania obviously has a substantial interest in 
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public health, safety, and consumer protection.  See, e.g., 
Grime v. Dep’t of Public Instruction, 188 A. 337, 381 (Pa. 
1936) (noting that the General Assembly has a legitimate 
interest in regulating the licensing of funeral directors in order 
“to protect the public health from the dangers attendant upon 
the inexpert conduct of undertaking by those not qualified by 
the necessary knowledge of principles of sanitation and 
disease prevention.”); Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 368 
(4th Cir. 2009) (“[A] State has ‘a legitimate interest in 
protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens 
through regulation of the funeral profession.’” (quoting 
Guardian Plans, Inc., 870 F.2d at 126)); Toms, 800 A.2d at 
346 (“‘[T]he General Assembly has a legitimate interest in 
regulating the funeral industry to safeguard the interests of the 
public and the standards of the profession.’” (quoting 
Ferguson v. Pa. State Bd. of Funeral Dirs., 768 A.2d 393, 
397-98 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001))).   
  
The Plaintiffs claim that Section 16(b) of the FDL does 
not satisfy Burger because a warrantless search is not 
necessary to further the regulatory objectives.  The Plaintiffs 
support that argument by highlighting differences between 
funeral homes on the one hand, and searches of premises 
involved in the rapid exchange of fungible items—e.g., the 
“chop shops” at issue in Burger—on the other.  According to 
the Plaintiffs, inspectors’ searches of funeral establishments 
are likely to focus on compliance with such regulations as 
building standards, and the need for surprise inspections is 
therefore attenuated to such an extent that it cannot justify a 
warrantless intrusion under Burger.   
  
Although that may be true, it is neither outcome 
determinative nor does it advance our inquiry.  Although the 
need for unannounced inspections of funeral parlors may not 
be as great as for other kinds of businesses, that does not 
negate the need for surprise inspections of  funeral parlors.  
The Board need not show that warrantless searches are the 
most necessary way to advance its regulatory interest.  See 
Contreras v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 1286, 1290 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“The pertinent inquiry is whether the [government’s] 
objectives would be frustrated by requiring a warrant or 
notice.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).     
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The Board persuasively explains that if inspectors are 
barred from entering funeral homes without a search warrant 
or advance notice, unscrupulous funeral practitioners could 
bring their establishments into regulatory compliance prior to 
an inspection, only to let them fall below prescribed standards 
when the threat of detection passes.  We agree.  Thus, 
Pennsylvania’s warrantless search regime is not qualitatively 
different from various other administrative inspection 
schemes that depend on the element of surprise to both detect 
and deter violations.  See, e.g., Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301, 
1308 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding statutory regime authorizing 
warrantless searches of businesses that supplied rabbits to 
research laboratories).   
  
Plaintiffs also argue that Section 16(b) cannot survive 
the third prong of the Burger inquiry because it does not 
sufficiently limit inspectors’ discretion and therefore cannot 
be a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.  The 
Plaintiffs base that claim on the statutory text which allows 
inspection for any complaints or “other matters as the board 
may direct[.]”  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.16(b).  According to 
the Plaintiffs, this gives inspectors nearly absolute discretion 
and infringes upon the privacy interests of funeral directors.  
Plaintiffs stress, for example, that “no regulation or policy 
specifies what will be inspected or when,” and they claim that 
the “frequency, nature, and extent of an inspection” appear to 
be left to an inspector’s discretion.  Plaintiffs’ Br. at 11. 
  
The third prong of the Burger test requires that a 
regulatory statute authorizing warrantless searches both (1) 
advise the owner of the premises that a search is pursuant to 
the law, and (2) limit the discretion of the officers conducting 
the search.  See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703.  “Inspectors, in other 
words, cannot barge into an establishment any time they want 
and inspect the place however they please.”  Contreras, 119 
F.3d at 1291.   
  
We agree that a delegation of authority as broad as that 
which Plaintiffs describe could not satisfy Burger.  However, 
Plaintiffs mischaracterize Section 16(b).  Their argument 
ignores other aspects of the statutory regime that place 
restrictions on warrantless searches under the FDL as 
required by Burger.  The statute plainly states that any 
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business that engages (or represents itself as engaging) in the 
practice of funeral directing is subject to search by Board 
inspectors.  Notice that inspections of private premises may 
take place “pursuant to the law” is sufficient under Burger, so 
long as limits are placed on the discretion of the inspecting 
officer.  See id. at 703, 711; see also LeSueur-Richmond Slate 
Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 
Burger Court meant that a statute permitting warrantless 
administrative searches must clearly indicate that the 
[relevant] property is subject to search, whether or not any 
government official actually conducts one.”). 
 Section 16(b) provides that only Board-appointed 
inspectors may search private premises used in the funeral 
business.  Accordingly, the FDL more closely circumscribes 
who may conduct searches than the statutory regimes that the 
Supreme Court upheld in Burger.  See Burger, 482 U.S. at 
704, 711 (discussing scheme authorizing inspections “by the 
police or any agent of the Department of Motor Vehicles”); 
see also Tart v. Commonwealth of Mass., 949 F.2d 490, 497 
(1st Cir. 1991) (upholding scheme authorizing “any 
authorized person” to inspect fishing permits).   
  
Moreover, while the FDL permits officers to inspect 
for “such . . . matters as the Board may direct,” it exclusively 
restricts the Board’s enforcement duties to matters pertaining 
to the FDL.  See 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.16(a).  As the Board 
correctly notes, under Burger we have upheld significantly 
broader grants of authority.  See Watson v. Abington Twp., 
478 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that 
Pennsylvania’s liquor board is authorized to inspect for “‘any 
violation of the Liquor Code or any law of the 
Commonwealth’” (quoting In re Catering Club Liquor 
License No. CC-4837 Issued to Fulton Post, Inc., 438 A.2d 
662, 663 (1981))); see also LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp., 
666 F.3d at 266. 
  
Plaintiffs’ Burger challenge also relies on the absence 
of appropriate temporal limitation on searches of funeral 
establishments.  The point is well taken, but we believe the 
absence of such restrictions is not fatal to the FDL.  Time 
limitations, along with those related to the scope and location 
of a search, are key to restricting inspectors’ discretion.  See 
Burger, 482 U.S. at 703.  Accordingly, courts reviewing 
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regulatory search schemes under Burger generally look to 
whether the statutes and regulations at issue place adequate 
temporal limits on government officers’ ability to conduct 
searches of private property.  Here, neither Section 16(b) of 
the FDL nor relevant Board regulations establish any such 
limitations—e.g., by requiring that officers conduct 
inspections during normal business hours. 
  
However, context matters and courts have consistently 
upheld statutes permitting administrative searches in the 
absence of time restrictions where such limitations would 
frustrate the underlying governmental interest.  See United 
States v. Vazquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 
2001) (upholding regulatory inspection scheme on 
commercial carriers and noting that “trucks operate twenty-
four hours a day”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Crosby 
v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
statute authorizing inspections of properties where alcohol 
was sold and permitting Georgia officers to “enter upon the 
licensed premises . . . at any time” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 3-2-32)); United States v. Dominguez-
Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting “limitation 
[on searches of commercial carriers] would . . . render the 
entire inspection scheme unworkable and meaningless”). 
  
Obviously, the concerns that lead to the regulation of 
funeral facilities do not disappear at the close of business, nor 
is the need for regulatory compliance restricted to business 
hours.  In fact, just the opposite may be true.  It is quite 
reasonable for the state to assume that owners of funeral 
businesses will be particularly careful to avoid disturbing or 
offending visitors and family members who are already 
grieving the loss of a loved one.  However, the health 
concerns that underlie much of the FDL’s regulatory scheme 
do not dissipate when those visitors and family members 
leave the funeral home.  Death is obviously not restricted to 
normal business hours and a funeral facility must continually 
maintain the corpse until it is finally removed.  Therefore the 
state has a strong interest in ensuring that the funeral business 
complies with applicable regulations 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week.  Limiting regulatory inspections to business hours 
would not advance that interest. 
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In mounting a facial challenge to the FDL, Plaintiffs 
must persuade us that “there is no set of circumstances” under 
which the FDL’s inspection scheme may be applied 
constitutionally.  See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 415-16.  Plaintiffs 
have failed to do so.  As we have just explained, the very fact 
that death is not restricted to normal business hours or 
workdays belies any suggestion that administrative searches 
of funeral parlors should be so restricted.  Given the totality 
of the FDL’s warrantless administrative inspection scheme, 
we hold that the statute adequately limits the discretion of 
government officers.9 
 
D.  Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants 
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among 
the several States.”  U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.3.  “This 
clause has an implied requirement—the Dormant 
Commerce Clause—that the states not ‘mandate 
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefit the former and burdens 
the latter.’”  Keystone Redev. Partners, LLC v. Decker, 
631 F.3d 89, 107 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Granholm v. 
Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005)).  Accordingly, it is 
“[a]xiomatic . . . that a state cannot impede free market 
forces to shield in-state businesses from out of state 
competition.”  Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. 
v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“Cloverland I”). 
  
Our dormant Commerce Clause inquiry begins with 
determining whether the FDL discriminates against interstate 
commerce in either purpose or effect.  See Am. Trucking 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Whitman, 437 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2006).  If 
so, the discriminatory restrictions must then survive 
heightened scrutiny to survive the Plaintiffs’ Commerce 
Clause challenge.  Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. 
Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 372 (3d Cir. 2012).  
                                              
9 In addition, we note that nothing in the record suggests that Board officers 
have conducted inspections of funeral homes outside of normal business hours.  
Indeed, the Board asserts—and the Plaintiffs concede—that because government 
inspectors are only paid for work performed between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., 
administrative inspections have exclusively taken place during those hours.  
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Heightened scrutiny requires the State to “‘demonstrate (1) 
that the statute serves a legitimate local interest, and (2) that 
this purpose could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means.’”  Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 
146, 158 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 
437 F.3d at 319).  
 If we determine that heightened scrutiny is 
inappropriate because the FDL’s provisions do not 
discriminate in favor of in-state interests, we then must 
balance interests pursuant to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
U.S. 137 (1970).  Pike balancing is necessary because 
“[s]tates may not impose regulations that place an undue 
burden on interstate commerce, even where those regulations 
do not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state 
businesses.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579-80 
(1995).  The Pike balancing inquiry requires that we 
determine “whether the [law’s] burdens on interstate 
commerce substantially outweigh the putative local 
benefits.’”  Freeman, 629 F.3d at 158 (quoting Cloverland-
Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 
249, 258 (3d Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted) (“Cloverland 
II”)).  Here, the District Court concluded that several of the 
FDL’s provisions unconstitutionally shielded Pennsylvania 
funeral establishments from out-of-state competition in 
violation of the Commerce Clause.  In explaining why we 
disagree with that conclusion we will separately discuss each 
of the allegedly discriminatory provisions.  
 
1.  Restrictions on Ownership and Alienability of Funeral 
Establishments 
 
The Plaintiffs first argue that FDL’s limits on the 
ownership of funeral establishments in Pennsylvania 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause.  The first 
challenged restriction that we will discuss is referred to 
as the “one-and-a-branch” limitation.  It restricts 
licensees to possessing an ownership interest in one 
funeral establishment with only a single “branch” 
location.  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 479.8(a)-(e).   
 
The second limitation that is challenged under the 
dormant Commerce Clause arises from a set of provisions 
governing funeral licensing requirements in Pennsylvania.  
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These provisions generally restrict ownership of an interest in 
funeral establishments to individuals and entities that had a 
license before 1935.  See id. §§ 479.8(a)-(c).  However, as we 
explained earlier, notwithstanding this limitation, these 
ownership provisions allow the estate of a deceased licensee 
or surviving spouse to receive a license to continue the 
business of the deceased licensee.  Similarly, immediate 
family members may hold a deceased funeral director’s stock 
in a restricted corporation upon death of the licensee. 
 
The District Court did not independently analyze the 
one-and-a-branch limitation in concluding that these 
“ownership restrictions” violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause. We will nevertheless examine the constitutionality of 
each of the ownership restrictions. 
 
a.  One-and-a-Branch Provision 
 
The one-and-a-branch provision states that “[l]icensees 
authorized to conduct a funeral practice . . . may practice at 
one principal place and no more than one branch place of 
business.”  Id. § 479.8(e).  Other provisions, in Section 8 of 
the FDL, similarly restrict business entities’ ownership 
interests.  See id. §§ 479.8(a), (b), (d).  The Plaintiffs allege 
that these provisions unconstitutionally prohibit out-of-state 
interests from operating a funeral business at more than two 
locations.   Plaintiffs claim that the unconstitutionality results 
from the resulting inability to “cluster”10 facilities so that they 
can more effectively compete with in-state funeral directors. 
 
We begin our analysis by asking “whether [the State 
law] discriminates on its face against interstate commerce.”  
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007).  The answer to that 
question is as obvious as it is straightforward.  Despite 
Plaintiffs’ attempt to conjure up a discriminatory impact on 
out-of-state funeral owners, it is clear from the text of the 
                                              
10 Plaintiffs define “clustering” as the sharing of employees and equipment 
between multiple locations.  Plaintiffs’ Br. at 26.  Plaintiffs contend that the 
prohibition on clustering -- i.e., limiting the extent to which the services of a 
funeral director can be shared across a cluster of funeral homes -- means that a 
firm attempting to cluster in Pennsylvania is required to hire more personnel at 
greater expense.  See Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
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statute that the challenged provisions impose the same 
limitation on out-of-state funeral directors and those in 
Pennsylvania.  There is simply no distinction under the FDL 
between in-state and out-of-state interests or impact.  The 
restriction burdens both to the same extent.  Any burden that 
results from these limitations affects all licensed individuals 
who possess an ownership interest in a funeral business 
operated in Pennsylvania regardless of the state of residency 
of any of its owners.  
 
Our dormant Commerce Clause inquiry only considers 
whether the impact of the limitation falls equally upon in-
state and out-of-state funeral directors; if so, there is clearly 
no discrimination in favor of Pennsylvania operators.  See 
Sixth Angel Shepherd Rescue, Inc. v. West, 477 F. App’x 903, 
907 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that, under the dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis, “we ask whether a challenged law 
discriminates against interstate commerce . . . [but a]bsent 
discrimination for the forbidden purpose . . . the law will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”) 
(quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-
39 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 
By way of example, a Pennsylvania resident who is a 
licensed funeral director in Pennsylvania and a Maryland 
resident who is a licensed funeral director in Pennsylvania are 
similarly barred from owning an interest in more than two 
funeral establishments in Pennsylvania.  In-state funeral 
parlor owners who want to achieve an economy of scale 
through “clustering” face the same obstacles as out-of-state 
owners who want to cluster.11   
  
We realize, of course, that the vast majority of individuals who apply 
for and obtain a Pennsylvania funeral directing license will probably reside in-
state in order to practice their trade.  Indeed, like the one-and-a-branch 
provision, many of the FDL’s requirements may render that choice all but 
inevitable.  However, that does not elevate the resulting choice to the level of 
unconstitutional coercion under the dormant Commerce Clause.  The funeral 
                                              
11 The Plaintiffs describe clustering as “the primary competitive advantage of [] 
out-of-state competitors.”  Plaintiffs’ Br. at 25.  Although the record contains 
evidence that supports the alleged consumer benefits flowing from an economy 
of scale business model, the record does not support the contention that the 
FDL’s interposition of an obstacle to clustering unilaterally advances the interest 
of Pennsylvania funeral establishments. 
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service “industry,” involving the internment and cremation of consumers’ loved 
ones, is by nature a highly localized enterprise.  So long as a State’s regulation 
operates evenhandedly as to both in-state and out-of-state actors seeking to enter 
such an industry, we do not subject it to heightened scrutiny under dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis.  See Am. Trucking Assocs., Inc., 545 U.S. at 437 (in 
upholding Michigan’s annual fee assessed on trucks engaged in intrastate 
commercial freight, the court noted the disputed provision “taxe[d] purely local 
activity; it does not tax an interstate truck’s entry into the State nor does it tax 
transactions spanning multiple States”); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 
481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (holding Indiana statute regulating acquisition of 
corporation stock did not merit heightened scrutiny because it had “same effects 
on tender offers whether or not the offeror is a domiciliary or resident of 
Indiana”).  
 
Accordingly, we hold that the one-and-a-branch 
restriction does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, 
and we thus reject the Plaintiffs’ contention that we should 
subject the applicable provisions of the FDL to heightened 
scrutiny.  See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1719 
(2013) (noting dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence “is 
driven by a concern about ‘economic protectionism—that is, 
regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors’” (quoting 
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 268, 273-74 
(1988)). 
 
Having determined that the one-and-a-branch 
limitation does not discriminate against out of state interests, 
we need only determine whether it can withstand scrutiny 
under the Pike balancing test.  See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. 
Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008).  We believe that it does.  
The “incidental burdens” that we must assess under Pike 
consist of  “the degree to which the state action incidentally 
discriminates against interstate commerce relative to 
intrastate commerce.”  Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 
388, 406 (3d Cir. 1987).  As we have just explained, the 
FDL’s one-and-a-branch restriction imposes the very same 
burdens on Pennsylvania funeral directors as it imposes on 
out-of-state interests.  Thus, the regulation here is a burden on 
commerce without discriminating against interstate 
commerce.  See Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer 
Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 826-27 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“[W]here the burden on out-of-state interests rises no higher 
than that placed on competing in-state interests, it is a burden 
on commerce rather than a burden on interstate commerce.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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b.  Licensing Restrictions 
 
The Plaintiffs contend that the FDL’s restrictions on 
who may obtain a funeral director license violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Usually, a funeral establishment in 
Pennsylvania may be owned by a licensed funeral director 
who, in turn, may operate the business as a sole 
proprietorship, a partnership (with one or more licensed 
funeral directors), or a restricted business corporation 
established for the sole purpose of providing funeral services.  
General business corporations are barred from owning a 
funeral home in Pennsylvania unless they are able to obtain 
one of 76 existing “pre-1935” licenses issued before the ban 
on corporations went into effect.  The law carves out limited 
exceptions and allows certain unlicensed individuals and 
entities—namely, the spouses, children, grandchildren, 
surviving spouse, or estate of a deceased licensed funeral 
director—to own and operate funeral homes in Pennsylvania.  
However, they may only do so if they employ a full-time 
licensed funeral director as supervisor.   63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
479.8(a). 
  
The District Court agreed with the Plaintiffs’ contention that this 
scheme effectively bans out-of-state entities from owning funeral homes within 
Pennsylvania   and subjected the ownership restrictions to heightened scrutiny.  
The Court then ruled that the restrictions could not survive the resulting inquiry.  
Alternatively, the Court found that even if heightened scrutiny was not 
appropriate, the FDL’s licensing restrictions could not survive Pike balancing.  
See Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 387.  We disagree with both conclusions.  
 
Any individual or entity can obtain the required license 
to operate a funeral home in Pennsylvania as long as certain 
requirements are satisfied.  None of those requirements 
mandate state residency or citizenship.  See id. at 388 (noting 
“an out-of-state individual may obtain a Pennsylvania funeral 
license by complying with the requirements for applicants”).  
Similarly, the statutory exceptions to the rule that only 
licensed individuals may own funeral homes in Pennsylvania 
provide that surviving family members of a deceased funeral 
director may own interests in a restricted business corporation 
regardless of their state of residency.   
 
Concomitantly, a general business corporation that 
does not own a “pre-1935” license is ineligible for a license 
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regardless of where it is domiciled.  Therefore, we cannot 
agree that the FDL’s ownership provisions “erect a barrier” 
protecting in-state interests from out-of-state competition that 
would trigger heightened scrutiny.  See Dean Milk Co. v. City 
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); see also Keystone 
Redev. Partners, LLC, 631 F.3d at 108. 
 
The limitation on licensing also survives the Pike 
balancing test.  As noted above, when we engage in Pike 
balancing, we consider whether any incidental burdens that 
the FDL’s ownership and license restrictions place on the 
flow of interstate commerce outweigh the statute’s putative 
local benefits.  See Norfolk S. Corp., 822 F.2d at 405-06.  
Here, Plaintiffs again posit that the FDL’s ownership 
restrictions burden interstate commerce by requiring out-of-
state interests to be licensed in order to own or operate funeral 
homes in Pennsylvania while excepting deceased licensed 
funeral directors’ families from that obligation.  The Board 
articulates three countervailing benefits of these restrictions: 
(1) disfavoring ownership of funeral homes by unlicensed 
individuals or corporations; (2) advancing the public interest 
in the continued operation of a funeral home after the 
licensee’s death; and (3) alleviating the financial loss to 
survivors who, on the death of a licensed director, might find 
themselves with a funeral home which they could neither 
operate nor sell at a fair price. 
The situation here is analogous to that which 
confronted the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2009).  There, the 
court rejected a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to 
Maryland’s Morticians and Funeral Directors Act.  That 
statute, like the FDL, required all individuals who desired to 
practice mortuary science in Maryland be licensed by the 
State’s Board of Morticians.  Md. Health Occ. Code § 7-
301(a).  Only the surviving spouses or executors of the estates 
of deceased licensed individuals could own a funeral 
establishment without a license.  Id. §§ 7-310(c)(2), 7-308, 7-
308.1.  Maryland’s law also prohibited licensing corporations 
but carved out an exception for corporations grandfathered 
under an earlier version of the statute.  Id. § 7-310.  The 
plaintiffs in Brown also argued that they should be able to 
own and operate funeral establishments without being 
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individually licensed or going through general purpose 
corporations.  Brown, 561 F.3d at 360. 
 
In rejecting that argument, the Court explained:  
 
Any person—out-of-state or in-
state—may obtain a license to 
practice mortuary science and 
own and operate a funeral 
establishment in Maryland, and 
there is no limit on the number of 
licenses that the State may issue.  
Likewise, with respect to the [] 
grandfathered corporations 
owning licenses, any person or 
corporation, out-of-state or in-
state, may own the stock. 
 
Id. at 364.  After surveying the alleged restrictions that 
Maryland placed on licenses, the Brown Court concluded that 
“entry into the Maryland funeral services market is limited 
only by the choices of the individual as to how best to 
allocate his or her time and resources.”  Id.  
 
 Were we to substitute “Pennsylvania” for “Maryland” 
in the above-quoted text, we could easily adopt the Fourth 
Circuit’s description of the operation of Maryland’s 
Morticians Act as our analysis of the corresponding 
provisions of the FDL.  Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ 
characterization of the effect, the FDL’s licensing and 
ownership restrictions affect in-state and out-of-state players 
equally.  
 
 The Plaintiffs highlight four alleged “significant differences” between 
the Maryland Morticians Act and the Pennsylvania FDL in an attempt to 
distinguish Brown.  They argue: (1) Maryland does not allow ownership by 
unlicensed spouses, children, and grandchildren of funeral directors and their 
trusts; (2) unlike Maryland, Pennsylvania allows corporate ownership of funeral 
homes through RBCs; (3) Maryland does not limit the number of funeral homes 
that may be owned, whereas Pennsylvania’s one-and-a-branch restriction limits 
ownership to two locations; and (4) Maryland does not allow the “Pinkerton 
rule,” a well-recognized (and Board-acknowledged) way to circumvent the 
FDL’s limitations that allows a licensee to “own” more than two locations by 
ceding his or her stock in other homes to third parties while retaining ownership 
over the establishments’ assets. 
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 These purported differences are neither significant nor persuasive.  The 
first claim is only partially correct—Maryland allows the executors and 
surviving spouses of deceased licensed funeral directors to own and operate a 
funeral establishment.  See Md. Health Occ. Code §§ 7-310(c)(2), 7-308, 7-
308.1.  The fact that Maryland does not extend similar benefits to the children 
and grandchildren of licensed funeral directors is of little import.  The second 
distinction is no less relevant to our analysis.  We do not agree with the level of 
importance that the Plaintiffs ascribe to Pennsylvania’s choice to allow restricted 
business corporations to own funeral homes within the State because that 
provision of the FDL applies equally to in-state and out-of-state interests.  
Indeed, the provision appears to expand access to the relevant market rather than 
contracting it as the Plaintiffs claim.  Moreover, we have already explained why 
the third purported distinction (Pennsylvania’s one-and-a-branch limitation) 
does not excessively burden interstate commerce.  Finally, that licensees—
whether they reside in-state or out-of-state—may avail themselves of the 
“Pinkerton rule” or other existing “end-runs” to circumvent the FDL’s express 
requirements says nothing about the constitutional validity of those provisions 
for purposes of a dormant Commerce Clause analysis.  The fact that some 
potential owners of funeral homes can circumvent the goals of the FDL through 
the Pinkerton mechanism also fails to establish a scheme that favors 
Pennsylvania businesses and residents.  The Pinkerton end-run operates the 
same way for in-state and out-of-state businesses and residents.    
 
 Under the FDL, any individual—out-of-state or in-
state—may apply for and obtain the applicable license as long 
as they satisfy general requirements relating to citizenship, 
professional education, and experience.  See 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 479.3(a)-(f).  Once an applicant satisfies these 
requirements, that individual—whether he or she resides in 
Pennsylvania or elsewhere—may be licensed as a 
“Pennsylvania funeral director” and is entitled to the same 
benefits that the FDL grants all other licensees regardless of 
state of residence.  The unlicensed surviving spouse of a 
deceased funeral director who resides in Ohio but routinely 
commutes to Pennsylvania to operate a funeral establishment 
that s/he owned, for example, is statutorily entitled to the 
same license under Section 479.8(a) as the surviving spouse 
of a funeral director residing in-state. 
 
 To be sure, this scenario likely represents the 
exception and not the norm; as this record attests, the vast 
majority of funeral directors who obtain a license to practice 
in Pennsylvania will no doubt choose to reside in the 
Commonwealth because of convenience or economic 
necessity.  However, this does not evidence any burden on 
interstate commerce nor discrimination against out-of-state 
operators.  Rather, there is nothing on this record to suggest 
that this is a reflection of anything other than the nature of the 
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funeral business.  “The practice of mortuary science is,” after 
all, “inherently a local profession.”  Brown, 561 F.3d at 363.   
 
 Moreover, as we have explained,  “virtually all state 
regulation involves increased costs for those doing business 
within the state, including out-of-state interests doing 
business in the state . . . .  In this absolute sense, virtually all 
state regulation ‘burdens’ interstate commerce.”  Norfolk S. 
Corp., 822 F.2d at 406.  Thus, our examination of a statute’s 
burden on interstate commerce must focus on whether 
regulatory scheme results in an excessive burden on interstate 
commerce.  That inquiry is informed by whether a State has 
“unjustifiably [] discriminate[d] against or burden[ed] the 
interstate flow of articles of commerce.”  Or. Waste Sys., Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Envi. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 
(1994). 
 
 We do not believe that the licensing requirements of 
the FDL run afoul of that limitation.  The State has made a 
rational decision that consumers in need of funeral services 
are better served by licensed individuals who, in the usual 
case, are not shielded by the cloak of corporate ownership.  
Cf. N.D. State Bd. of Pharma. v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 
414 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1973) (“‘A standing criticism of the 
use of corporations in business is that it causes such business 
to be owned by people who do not know anything about it.’” 
(quoting Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 
114-15 (1928))); see also Brown, 561 F.3d at 367.  We cannot 
“accept [the] notion that the Commerce Clause protects the 
particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market  
. . . .  [T]he Clause protects the interstate market, not 
particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome 
regulations.”  Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 
127-28 (1978); see also McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 
469 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge where state law “prevent[ed] [plaintiff] from using 
his ‘chosen way of doing business,’ but [did] not prevent him 
from engaging in business in the [State]”).   
 
 Similarly, although Pennsylvania has carved out 
limited exceptions to its own rule by allowing unlicensed 
family members to participate in the ownership of a funeral 
home, those exceptions—enacted with the twin purposes of 
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ensuring that a funeral establishment continues to serve the 
community after the death of a licensed funeral director and 
protecting the deceased’s director’s family—do not impose 
burdens (excessive or otherwise) on the flow of interstate 
commerce.  We therefore conclude that the District Court 
erred in ruling that that the FDL’s licensing and ownership 
restrictions violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 
2.  Preparation Room Requirement 
 
 Section 7 of the FDL provides that “every 
establishment in which the profession of funeral directing is 
carried on shall include a preparation room, containing 
instruments and supplies for the preparation and embalming 
of human bodies.”  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.7.  The Plaintiffs 
claim that this provision violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause by protecting established in-state funeral homes at the 
expense of out-of-state interests seeking to enter the market.  
According to Plaintiffs, the preparation room requirement 
deprives out-of-state competitors of any competitive 
advantage that they could otherwise gain from consolidating 
embalming operations in one centralized facility from which 
they could service other locations.12 
 
 Here again, the Plaintiffs’ challenge ignores the fact 
that any impediments arising from the preparation room 
requirement burden all funeral directors operating in 
Pennsylvania.  Out-of-state entities are not specifically 
targeted, deprived of a competitive advantage, nor afforded a 
competitive advantage compared to Pennsylvania businesses.  
See Cloverland II, 462 F.3d at 263; see also Town of Southold 
v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2007).  
Indeed, to the extent that the preparation room requirement 
has an effect on interstate commerce, it is incidental at most.  
Consequently, the provision will only violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause if it does not survive Pike balancing—i.e., 
if its burdens on interstate commerce “clearly outweigh” its 
putative local benefits.  See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. 
at 353. 
 
                                              
12 The Plaintiffs do not allege that the FDL’s preparation room requirement is 
discriminatory on its face, but in its operation.  
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 The “burden” that the preparation room requirement 
imposes on interstate commerce consists of the cost of 
equipping each funeral establishment with a preparation room 
and the resulting impediment that arises from requiring 
“centralized” embalming facilities.  We do not doubt that 
these burdens can be significant.13  However, they are not so 
significant as to “clearly outweigh” the State’s asserted 
interests in minimizing the time between death and 
embalming, reassuring customers that the remains of their 
loved ones will be in the funeral home’s custody at all times, 
minimizing the possibility of accidents in-transit between 
embalming facilities, and ensuring accountability. 
 
 Moreover, although the Plaintiffs make much of the 
State’s apparent admission that the preparation room 
requirement is either unnecessary or unduly burdensome, 
Plaintiffs fail to realize that the concession is without 
constitutional significance.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs point 
to a 2008 legislative initiative in which the Board advocated 
for the repeal of the preparation room requirement because of 
the economic benefits of dispensing with the policy.  The 
Plaintiffs also highlight a 1994 Audit Report, which said that 
requiring each funeral home to have its own preparation room 
was “burdensome and unnecessary” and noted the resulting 
additional costs to funeral directors and consumers.  J.A. 846.   
 
There are two reasons why this concession lacks the 
constitutional significance that Plaintiffs attach to it.  First, 
the recommendation that the preparation room requirement be 
repealed appears to have resulted from the requirement’s 
intrastate economic impact.  The Report is therefore not 
particularly helpful to our focus on the burdens on interstate 
commerce as required under Pike.  See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. 
Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 430 (1994) 
(“[L]ocal burdens are not the focus of the dormant Commerce 
Clause . . . .”).  Second—and more importantly—neither the 
Board’s views in the above-referenced 2008 legislative 
initiative nor the Audit Report’s recommendation to repeal 
the preparation room requirement were enacted into law.  
Thus, notwithstanding any reservations that some 
                                              
13 The Plaintiffs estimate the costs of establishing a preparation room to be 
approximately $220,000 to a funeral home during its first year. 
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Pennsylvania officials might have expressed in the past, the 
preparation room requirement remains the law of 
Pennsylvania.14  
 
3.  Place of Practice and Full-Time Supervisor 
Requirement 
 
 Section 7 of the FDL provides that a “license shall 
authorize the conduct of the [funeral directing] profession at 
the particular place of practice thereon and no other.”  63 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 479.7.  Somewhat confusingly, this section also 
provides that a funeral director is free to “assist another duly 
licensed person, partnership or corporation[.]”   Presumably, 
this applies to assisting at another branch location.  Id.  In 
addition, Section 8(e) mandates that each branch location 
must retain a licensed funeral director as a “full-time 
supervisor.”  Id. 479.8(e).  However, a funeral director may 
not supervise more than one location.  Id. § 479.2(11).  In 
Counts V and VI of the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs 
alleged that both the FDL’s “place-of-practice” restrictions 
and full-time supervisor requirement violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Once again, the District Court agreed.  
See Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 397-99.   
 The Plaintiffs claim that these provisions facially 
discriminate against out-of-state interests and must therefore 
be subjected to heightened scrutiny.  They allege that, under 
the place-of-practice provision, a funeral director who 
practices at one location in another state would be precluded 
from practicing in Pennsylvania because that would constitute 
practicing at a second location.  According to the Plaintiffs, a 
                                              
14 In addition, the opinions that the Board may have expressed in the past in its 
capacity as an administrative arm of the Commonwealth may inform judicial 
inquiry into whether the full-time supervisor requirement excessively burdens 
interstate commerce, but it does not end it.  The 2008 legislative initiative 
simply does not have the force of Commonwealth law.  Unlike a statute or 
Board-issued regulation, it does not embody official Commonwealth policy, but 
only the views that the Board saw fit to communicate to the Pennsylvania 
legislature at a particular time.  See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584 
(1994) (“‘[C]ourts have no authority to enforce a principle gleaned solely from 
legislative history that has no statutory reference point.’” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, Local Union 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (1987) (alterations 
omitted))); see also Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 
2006) (per curiam) (discounting importance of legislative silence “coupled with 
a sentence in a legislative committee report untethered to any statutory 
language”). 
31 
 
funeral director who manages a location in another state 
would be similarly barred from obtaining a funeral supervisor 
license in Pennsylvania.  Plaintiffs’ argument is supported by 
a letter from the Board denying a New Jersey applicant’s 
request for a funeral supervisor license on these grounds.  J.A. 
1455. 
 
 We decline to adopt Plaintiffs’ reasoning as to these 
provisions.  We recognize that the FDL’s place-of-practice 
restriction and full-time supervisor requirement compel a 
funeral director to relinquish one operating license in favor of 
another, should he or she wish to supervise another location.  
§ 479.2(11).  However, we disagree that this provision 
facially discriminates against out-of-state interests.  Having to 
surrender an out- of-state license to practice in Pennsylvania 
is simply the result of the operation of the one-and-a-branch 
rule, and the limits it places on being an owner and/or 
supervisor of a funeral home.  Moreover, Pennsylvania 
residents also have to surrender an existing license in order to 
operate more than the two establishments allowed under the 
restriction.  Thus, it makes no difference where the funeral 
homes or owners are located.  
 
E.  Substantive Due Process 
 
 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits the states 
from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.  The prohibition has both a procedural and 
substantive component.  See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 846 (1992); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  The Plaintiffs 
have continually alleged that several of the FDL’s provisions violate their right 
to substantive due process. 
 
 Unless a legislative enactment abridges “certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), we 
apply a more lenient “rational basis” inquiry, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 
(1973), in determining the statute’s constitutionality.  Here, Plaintiffs concede 
that we should apply rational basis review to their substantive due process 
challenge.  
 
  Under rational basis review, “‘a statute withstands a substantive due 
process challenge if the state identifies a legitimate state interest that the 
legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute.’”  Alexander v. 
Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of 
Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1995)).  We have repeatedly warned 
that rational basis review is by no means “toothless”—“[a] necessary corollary 
to and implication of rationality as a test is that there will be situations where 
proffered reasons are not rational.”  Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 
95, 112 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 905 n.15 
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(3d Cir. 1982).  Nevertheless, rational basis review allows legislative choices 
considerable latitude.   See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 
(1993).  A governmental interest that is asserted to defend against a substantive 
due process challenge need only be plausible to pass constitutional muster; we 
do not second-guess legislative choices or inquire into whether the stated motive 
actually motivated the legislation.  See United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 
U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“Where . . . there are plausible reasons for Congress’ 
action, our inquiry is at an end.  It is . . . ‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this 
reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision’ . . . .”  (quoting Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960))).   
 
 Thus, as we recently explained, “‘the rationality requirement [is] 
largely equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality.’”  Connelly v. 
Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Laurence H. 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-2, at 1442-43 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 
1.  “One-and-a-Branch” Limitation 
 
 In addition to the dormant Commerce Clause challenge discussed 
above, the Plaintiffs also attack the one-and-a-branch limitation on substantive 
due process grounds. The Board argues that the limitation advances five 
legitimate state interests.  Those interests are:  (1) diversifying the ownership of 
funeral establishments; (2) preventing a single firm from dominating a local 
market through “clustering”; (3) limiting the damage to consumers and a 
community from the possible failure of a single firm; (4) promoting familiarity 
and accountability between funeral directors and their consumers; and (5) 
preventing licensees from being “spread too thin.”  We perceive no substantive 
difference in the first three goals and will treat them as the same legislative 
objective for purposes of our analysis.15  
 
 These goals are clearly legitimate.  “[A] state has a ‘legitimate interest 
in protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens through regulation of 
the funeral profession[;]’”  Brown, 561 F.3d at 368 (quoting Guardian Plans, 
870 F.2d at 126), and the Pennsylvania legislature could have reasonably 
concluded that these objectives advance those interests.  Accordingly, the one-
and-a-branch limitation will survive rational basis review unless the State 
legislature could not rationally conclude that the provision furthered these ends. 
 
 The Plaintiffs make several arguments to support their contention that 
the one-and-a-branch restriction does not reasonably advance the State’s stated 
objectives.  For example, they claim that restricting the number of locations that 
a licensee may own (to two) does not rationally prevent a funeral director from 
being “spread too thin,” since s/he may still have to perform thousands of 
funerals a year at the locations that are licensed.  The Plaintiffs also note that a 
funeral director could effectively own a potentially unlimited number of homes 
by employing loopholes like the so-called “Pinkerton rule,” thereby allowing a 
single firm to de facto dominate a local market and thus undermine the goal of 
limiting the damage to consumers when a firm that is “too big to fail” does, in 
fact, fail.16   
                                              
15 Diversification is merely one of the ways that the Commonwealth is trying to 
advance the second and third objectives.  
16 As we explained above, the “Pinkerton rule” refers to the practice of allowing 
a licensee to circumvent the one-and-a-branch restriction by transferring his or 
her stock in a funeral establishment to another entity or individual while 
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 However, the one-and-a-branch limitation is not constitutionally infirm 
merely because its response to legitimate governmental concerns is imprecise 
and imperfect.  “[U]nder the deferential standard of review applied in 
substantive due process challenges to economic legislation there is no need for 
mathematical precision in the fit between justification and means.”  Concrete 
Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 
U.S. 602, 639 (1993).  Therefore, the one-and-a-branch limitation can survive 
our substantive due process inquiry even though it neither targets all applicable 
threats nor succeeds in preventing all of them.  Despite the limitation’s 
imperfection, the State could have rationally concluded that limiting licensees to 
owning funeral businesses at no more than two locations would limit the number 
of consumers that a director could service and avoid the problems that could 
arise when a funeral director is “spread too thin.”  All that is necessary is that 
the selected means is rationally linked to the stated ends.  See Stretton v. 
Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991) (“A 
state is permitted to take steps . . . that only partially solve a problem without 
totally eradicating it.”). 
 
 Similarly, the fact that Pennsylvania’s current statutory and regulatory 
scheme does not prevent licensees from sidestepping the limitation by seizing 
upon loopholes such as the “Pinkerton rule” is not constitutionally fatal. “‘A 
legislature need not . . . risk [] losing an entire remedial scheme simply because 
it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might 
conceivably have been attacked.’”  Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198, 202 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 
(1969)).  We therefore conclude that the FDL’s one-and-a-branch limitation 
easily weathers scrutiny under rational basis review.  
 
2.  Licensing Restrictions 
 
 The Plaintiffs also raise a substantive due process challenge to the other 
restrictions in the FDL that we have discussed above as part of our dormant 
Commerce Clause discussion.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the State 
acted irrationally in limiting ownership of funeral homes to licensed funeral 
directors while barring general business corporations from obtaining the 
required license.  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.8(a).  Here, as before, the Plaintiffs 
highlight the FDL’s “exceptions,” which allow the administrators of a deceased 
licensee’s estate and his or her surviving spouse and family members to possess 
an ownership interest in a funeral establishment under specific circumstances, 
whether or not they possess a funeral directors’ license.17  Plaintiffs contend that 
these exceptions belie the Board’s asserted interest in promoting consumer 
protection, accountability, competency, trust, and accessibility.  Rather, 
                                                                                                     
retaining ownership over the establishment’s assets.  Since the Board has 
recognized that the FDL does not restrict who may own or lease the assets 
necessary to operate a funeral home, this “loophole” would presumably allow a 
licensee to de facto “own” an unlimited number of funeral homes within the 
Commonwealth. 
17 As explained, administrators of a licensee’s estate may possess an ownership 
interest for a maximum of three years.  Widows and widowers may own an 
interest in a funeral home for an indefinite period so long as they remain 
unmarried.  Section 8(b)(4) of the FDL allows immediate family members of a 
deceased licensed funeral director or shareholder to own shares of an RBC. 
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according to Plaintiffs, these exceptions demonstrate that the licensing 
requirement is not rationally related to those objectives.  
 
 The argument incorrectly presupposes that Pennsylvania’s response to 
its stated objectives had to be limited to addressing a single objective at a time.  
An otherwise rational legislative response to a given concern cannot be 
invalidated under the Due Process Clause merely because the chosen solution 
creates other problems while addressing the original concern.  Rather, 
legislatures are generally free to consider and balance several interests in 
carrying out their legislative responsibilities.  See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. 
Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (noting “Congress’s prerogative to balance opposing 
interests”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (“How best to 
reconcile competing interests is the business of legislatures . . . .”); see also Pace 
Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1035 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting 
“process of democratic political decision-making often entails [] accommodation 
of competing interests”).  Accordingly, where, as here, a State does not infringe 
upon fundamental rights or interests, it may address multiple or even competing 
objectives as long as its actions are rationally related to legitimate legislative 
objectives. 
 
 Throughout this litigation, the Board has consistently reasoned that the 
exceptions to the FDL’s licensing requirement address Pennsylvania’s distinct 
interest in protecting the livelihood of a licensed director’s surviving family 
members and the interests of the community in a funeral home’s continued 
operation following the death of the owner.  It is not at all difficult to see how 
the licensing exceptions that the Plaintiffs have chosen to attack address that 
legitimate governmental interest – albeit imperfectly.  In upholding Maryland’s 
Mortician’s Act against a similar Due Process challenge in Brown v. Hovatter, 
the Court explained “exemptions” to Maryland’s licensing requirement that 
allowed unlicensed surviving spouses and executors of deceased licensed 
morticians to possess an ownership in funeral establishments as follows: 
 
 [C]orporations that historically held 
licenses in the funeral business were allowed 
to continue to hold licenses because the 
General Assembly wanted to protect 
reliance interests of family members.  For a 
similar reason, spouses of deceased 
licensees are exempted from being licensed 
to allow the spouse, who presumably was 
already involved in the affairs of the 
business, to continue the business.  The Act 
also provides an exemption for executors of 
licensees, allowing the temporary operation 
of the funeral establishment to wind down 
the affairs of the business.  The fact that the 
General Assembly created these rational 
exemptions does not undermine the overall 
rationality of the Morticians Act based on its 
relationship to a legitimate government 
purpose. 
 
561 F.3d at 369. 
 
  We agree.  As in Brown, the Pennsylvania legislature was free to 
consider the reliance interests of communities throughout the state as well as 
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those of the deceased funeral directors’ family in crafting the limitations 
contained in the FDL.  The means chosen is a rational (though perhaps 
imperfect) means of achieving those ends, and Section 8(a) of the FDL does not 
violate substantive due process.18 
 
3.  “Place-of-practice” and Full-Time Supervisor 
Requirement 
 
 As explained above, a license issued pursuant to the FDL only 
authorizes a licensee to practice at one primary location and one branch location; 
each location must have its own full-time and licensed supervisor.  63 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 479.7, 479.8(e).  The District Court concluded that both provisions 
denied Plaintiffs’ right to substantive due process because the Board’s asserted 
interests in ensuring “competency, public health, accountability, and 
competition [were] not rationally related to the [FDL’s] restrictions . . . .”  
Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
 On appeal, the Plaintiffs concede the State has a legitimate concern in 
safeguarding these interests, but they argue that the legislature could not have 
rationally believed that the place-of-practice restriction and full-time supervisor 
requirement would serve that purpose.19  Once again, we disagree.   
 
We haven repeatedly stressed the obvious; Pennsylvania clearly has a 
legitimate interest in protecting consumers who must venture into the potentially 
exploitative market for funeral services.  See Brown, 561 F.3d at 368.  As the 
Court explained in Kleese v. Pa. State Bd. Of Funeral Dirs , 738 A.2d 523, 526 
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), “[g]enerally, the time in which the consumer seeks the 
services of a funeral establishment is a very emotional and vulnerable time as a 
loved one has most likely just passed away leaving the consumer vulnerable and 
more susceptible to being deceived or cheated.”   Limiting licensees to one 
primary location and one branch, each with its own licensed supervisor, clearly 
helps to protect against funeral directors being “spread too thin” to provide 
personal, caring, and sensitive services to those who are mourning the loss of a 
loved one.  Funeral businesses clearly must operate with a sensitivity and 
personalized service unlike few other business we can think of, and 
Pennsylvania’s legislature can hardly be faulted for imposing restrictions that 
are intended to address the unique concerns in that industry.   
                                              
18 For the same reasons, we also reject the Plaintiffs’ claim that Section 8(e) of 
the FDL is unconstitutional.  That provision provides that a licensed shareholder 
of an RBC may bequeath his or her shares or stock in the restricted corporation 
to immediate family members.   
 
19 The Plaintiffs correctly note that the Board has not articulated benefits or 
legitimate purposes that specifically underlie the place-of-practice restriction in 
its briefing to us.  Plaintiffs’ Br. at 35.  However, the Board’s brief does assert 
that the FDL’s “operational provisions”—which it defines to include the FDL’s 
place-of-practice restriction, full-time supervisor requirement, preparation room 
requirement, and restrictions on food service—are all in place to further “a 
variety of legitimate interests such as quality assurance, accountability, and 
health and safety.”  Appellant’s Br. at 16.  In any case, we note that, as the party 
challenging the Commonwealth’s statute, the Plaintiffs bear the burden of 
refuting “‘every conceivable basis which might support it,’” Beach Commc’ns, 
Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added), not just those that the Commonwealth 
may assert, see Connelly, 706 F.3d at 216. 
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Likewise, the place-of-practice requirement is a rational means of 
advancing accountability by ensuring that a funeral director is more readily 
accessible to answer questions from grieving and particularly vulnerable 
consumers.  The requirement of a full-time supervisor is so obviously reasonable 
as to negate the need for in-depth discussion or inquiry.  We merely note that the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly could have rationally believed that requiring a 
licensed funeral director to oversee each funeral home advances the goal of 
maintaining professional standards at funeral establishments, and, by extension, 
safeguards public health, safety, and welfare.  It also increases the likelihood 
that vulnerable consumers will be able to readily communicate with someone 
who is responsible for providing services for a deceased loved one.  It is 
reasonable to assume that the individuals who have met the State’s licensing 
requirements are much better equipped to supervise funeral home operations 
than an unlicensed entrepreneur would be.  Cf. Guardian Plans Inc., 870 F.2d at 
126 (noting legislature “could have rationally determined that keeping the 
arrangement of funerals in the hands of licensed funeral professionals would 
benefit the public by ensuring competence in funeral arrangement”). 
 
We are similarly unpersuaded by the Plaintiffs’ suggestion that a 
funeral home that routinely performs 1,000 funerals each year and another that 
performs only twenty-five would each comply with the requirement so long as 
they hired a single supervisor.  That reality does not alter the result of our 
rational basis review.  The State could have adopted a different scheme that 
would have required funeral homes that routinely perform a high volume of 
funerals each year to retain multiple supervisors.  However, as we explained 
above, “[a] legislative policy decision about where [] line[s] should be 
drawn . . . ‘[is] not legally relevant under substantive due process 
jurisprudence.’”  Alexander, 114 F.3d at 1406 (quoting Sammon, 66 F.3d at 
647)). 
 
4.  The Preparation Room Requirement 
 
 The Plaintiffs also argue that requiring each funeral home to include a 
preparation room for on-site embalming is irrational because neither the FDL 
nor the Board’s regulations require that a funeral establishment actually use this 
room.20  According to Plaintiffs, the preparation room requirement is not 
practical and it hinders funeral directors’ ability to prepare bodies in a more 
cost-effective centralized location.  Plaintiffs explain that centralizing this 
service would achieve economies of scale that would benefit consumers and 
allow funeral directors to service other locations as part of a “cluster.”  Plaintiffs 
contend that requiring each funeral home to have its own preparation room 
(which may not even be used) thus imposes significant expense on consumers 
with little (if any) corresponding benefit.  The District Court agreed that “there 
is no rational relationship between providing access to preparation rooms and 
requiring that funeral homes expend unnecessary funds on the same when the 
Board [has] recognize[d] that many existing preparation rooms remain [] 
                                              
20 Pennsylvania law does not require that all deceased remains be embalmed.  
Instead, families can choose whether or not to embalm a deceased person.  See, 
e.g., 49 Pa. Code § 13.201(6)(i) (“Human remains held 24 hours beyond death 
shall be embalmed or sealed in a container that will not allow fumes or odors to 
escape or be kept under refrigeration, if this does not conflict with a religious 
belief or medical examination.”). 
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unused, and . . . costs are merely passed on to consumers.”  See Heffner, 866 F. 
Supp. 2d at 402. 
 
 The Board once again asserts several purportedly legitimate interests 
that support this requirement.  The Board claims that this requirement: (1) 
minimizes the time between death and embalming, leading to better results; (2) 
reassures families regarding the safeguarding of their loved ones; (3) minimizes 
the possibilities for accidents in transit and mix-ups at separate embalming 
facilities; and (4) ensures that the funeral director with whom the family 
communicates is directly accountable for the results of his/her work. 
 
 The record contains an uncontested expert report which shows that 
Pennsylvania’s requirement of an on-site embalming preparation room at each 
funeral establishment is consistent with the regulatory scheme of at least 
eighteen other states – each of which had a similar requirement as of the latter-
half of 2010.21  See J.A. 635; see also Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1212-13 
(10th Cir. 2004) (noting Oklahoma had similar preparation room requirement as 
of date case decided).  Although a majority of states have chosen not to adopt 
this approach and either allow funeral directors to “cluster” embalming 
operations under an economy of scale model or exempt certain funeral 
establishments from having a preparation room, the costs or benefits of these 
approaches are beyond the parameters of our due process inquiry.  A chosen 
legislative scheme need not be the most efficient or even the most practical to be 
reasonable under the Due Process Clause.  See Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (“[A] law need not be in every respect 
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that there is 
an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).   Moreover, the 
rationale advanced by the Board to support the preparation room requirement 
seems so patently reasonable as to eliminate the need for much discussion.  See 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).  As long as the State has chosen 
a rational method of addressing its concerns, our inquiry is at an end.  See id. 
(“[I]t is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of 
legislation.”). 
 
 Indeed, even if we credit the Plaintiffs’ assertion—and the Board’s 
concession in the 2008 legislative materials that many preparation rooms built to 
comply with the FDL are never actually used for embalming—the result of our 
rational basis review would be the same.  The Constitution does not protect 
against inefficient, wasteful, or meaningless legislation. “[A] law may exact a 
needless, wasteful requirement in many cases.  But it is for the legislature, not 
the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the [] requirement.”  
Id. at 487.  Consequently, we hold that the District Court erred in concluding 
that the separate embalming room requirement violates the Plaintiffs’ right to 
substantive due process.  
 
5.  Restriction on Serving Food 
 
                                              
21 According to the Board’s submissions, the following states, in addition to 
Pennsylvania, all required funeral homes to each contain a preparation room as 
of late 2010:  Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and 
Wyoming.  J.A. 635.  
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 In addition to the preparation room requirement, Section 7 of the FDL 
also prohibits funeral establishments from serving “food or intoxicating 
beverages.”  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.7.  The provision does allow funeral 
establishments to serve customers non-alcoholic beverages, but only in “a 
separate room not used for the preparation of funeral service.”  Id. 
 
 The District Court concluded that this restriction also violated 
substantive due process.  See Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 403-04.  The Court 
based its ruling, in part, on a proposed 2009 regulation in which the Board 
recommended repeal of these restrictions.  The District Court explained its 
rejection of the Board’s argument that the food prohibition furthered the 
government’s legitimate interest in promoting public health as follows: “[the 
Board] fail[ed] to explain how the use of [] chemicals in one part [of the facility] 
. . . would necessarily contaminate other areas of the establishment providing 
food service . . .”  Id. at 404.  The Court relied on the fact that bodies are 
prepared in one area of a funeral establishment and food is served elsewhere.  
Ultimately, the District Court concluded that the restriction did not survive 
rational basis review because: (1) the fact that non-alcoholic beverages could be 
served but food could not presented a “distinction without a difference,” id., and 
(2) it was irrational for the FDL to allow food to be served in certain areas 
within the same structure so long as those areas were not designated as parts of a 
“funeral establishment,” id. 
 
 On appeal, the Board reiterates its position that “public health” is a 
legitimate government interest justifying the FDL’s ban on food service at 
funeral establishments.  The Board argues that the legislature could have 
reasonably concluded that food should not be served where the embalming of 
human bodies is occurring.  The Board also argues that the ban on serving food 
furthers the government’s interest in upholding the unique nature and solemnity 
of funeral services. 
 
Whether one agrees with the Board’s position, and assuming arguendo 
that the Board’s reasoning is erroneous, it is exceedingly difficult to understand 
how it could be viewed as unreasonable.  The first prong of the rational basis 
test is easily satisfied by the Board’s asserted interest in public health.22  See 
Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (“It is too well settled to require 
discussion . . . that the police power of the states extends to the regulation of 
certain trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the public 
health.”).  We fail to see anything irrational in the legislative decision to prohibit 
the service of food and alcoholic beverages in areas designated as “funeral 
establishments” under the FDL.23  It may well be that the legislature’s concern 
                                              
22 Because we believe that the Commonwealth’s asserted interest in protecting 
public health is legitimate, we do not pass judgment on whether the Board’s 
second asserted interest—i.e., “preserving the unique nature and solemnity of 
the funeral service”—also qualifies as a legitimate government interest under 
substantive due process review.  See N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 669 F.3d at 398 
(noting statute “will pass rational basis examination” where one of several stated 
purposes was not legitimate “as long as it was not the only legitimate purpose 
underlying the legislation”). 
 
23 Indeed, the authority of states to regulate and tightly restrict the availability of 
alcohol is far too evident to require either citation or discussion, and 
Pennsylvania’s restrictions on the availability of alcohol are particularly strict.  
See generally 47 Pa. Stat. §§ 4-491– 494.  However, such tight controls (of 
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had more force in an earlier time when refrigeration and sanitation were not as 
developed as they are today, outdoor temperatures could more readily affect 
sanitation as well as food storage and preservation, and attitudes about serving 
and consuming alcohol were nowhere near as liberal.  Thus, the passage of time, 
and the advanced technology used in modern air conditioning and ventilation 
systems suggest that the Pennsylvania General Assembly may want to revisit the 
need for some of these restrictions as the Board has suggested.   
 
However, there is a fundamental difference between legislative 
enactments that may be archaic and those that are irrational for purposes of our 
substantive due process inquiry.  These restrictions may now be overly cautious, 
but excess caution does not rise to the level of a due process deprivation if it is 
reasonably intended to advance a legitimate governmental interest.  It is not up 
to a court to determine if the State has struck the perfect balance of advantage 
and disadvantage in addressing its interest, nor should we compel legislatures to 
reexamine restrictions that may seem better suited for an earlier time.  See 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (“[C]ourts are compelled under 
rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is 
an imperfect fit between means and ends.”).  The Constitution is not a lever that 
we can use to overcome legislative inertia.  This restriction, though perhaps 
antiquated, is nevertheless sufficiently reasonable to survive rational basis 
review. 
 
6.  Trust Requirement 
 
 Funeral directors in Pennsylvania routinely sell and provide “pre-need” 
funeral services – i.e., services selected in advance of a person’s death.  See 
generally Walker v. Flitton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 503 (M.D. Pa. 2005).  Because 
these contracts require advance payment for goods and services associated with 
funeral homes, Pennsylvania (like many other states) imposes trust requirements 
on pre-need sellers.24  Specifically, the FDL requires that a funeral director who 
enters into a pre-need contract deposit 100% of the proceeds accepted for 
“funeral services,” such as embalming, into an escrow account or trust.  63 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 479.13(c).25 
                                                                                                     
which the FDL is but one example) do not rise to the level of a due process 
violation.  
24 See generally Judith A. Frank, Preneed Funeral Plans: The Case for 
Uniformity, 4 Elder L.J.1, 7-8 (1996) (discussing trust arrangement as “most 
common form of funding” in preneed funeral contract context and collecting 
States’ statutes establishing trust requirement). 
 
25 In relevant part, the FDL states: 
No person other than a licensed funeral 
director shall, directly or indirectly, or 
through an agent, offer to or enter into a 
contract with a living person to render 
funeral services to such person when 
needed.  If any such licensed funeral director 
shall accept any money for such contracts, 
he shall . . . either deposit the same in an 
escrow account in, or transfer the same in 
trust to, a banking institution in 
[Pennsylvania], conditioned upon its 
withdrawal or disbursement only for the 
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 This trust arrangement is confusing because another statute, the 
Pennsylvania Future Interment Act (“FIA”), only requires that 70% of the sales 
price of funeral-related property—e.g., caskets, vaults, or urns— be held in trust.  
Id. § 480.1.  This creates an obvious problem for funeral directors who provide 
pre-need services.   In an attempt to reconcile the tension in these statutes, the 
Board took the position that funeral directors were only required to hold in trust 
70% of the sales price customers paid for pre-need funeral merchandise, but that 
they had to hold 100% of pre-need monies for other “funeral services” in trust. 
 
In Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Funeral Directors, 494 A.2d 67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), aff’d 
mem., 511 A.2d 763 (Pa. 1986) (“PFDA”), the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the 
Board’s position and held that the FIA “did not abrogate the 
one hundred per cent trust requirement in . . . the [FDL].”  Id. 
at 72.  The Board thereafter adopted the view that a 
merchandising company that is not itself a licensee but is 
nevertheless owned in part by a licensed funeral director may 
trust at the FIA-prescribed rate of 70%, so long as the 
company is not used to evade the FDL’s requirements. 
  
In challenging the trusting provisions, Plaintiffs argue 
that requiring licensed funeral directors to hold in trust 100% 
of pre-need monies received does not further the State’s 
asserted interest in consumer protection, and the District 
Court agreed.  See Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 423.  However, 
the fact that Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme restricts 
individuals whom the State has certified as experts, while 
exempting unlicensed merchants, does not necessarily result 
in an irrational (and therefore unconstitutional) scheme.  As 
the Commonwealth Court explained in PFDA, Pennsylvania’s 
legislature could have reasonably “believed that the public’s 
perception of funeral directors as licensed professionals 
necessitated stricter standards to protect consumers.”  494 
A.2d at 71. 
 
In addition, the Board correctly notes that the trust 
requirements also pass constitutional muster under the 
separate interpretation that it has adopted and endorsed.  See 
Skilling v. United States, 130. S. Ct. 2896, 2929 (2010) 
(“‘[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in 
                                                                                                     
purposes for which such money was 
accepted. 
63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.13(c). 
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order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting 
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))).  As we 
have just explained, after PFDA was decided, the Board 
adopted the view that funeral directors with an ownership 
interest in a merchandising company may sell pre-need 
funeral property if their company is owned and operated 
“separate and apart” from a funeral home or establishment.  
Plaintiffs concede that the Board explained its position in a 
1991 memorandum, which outlined a series of factors that 
could be used to determine whether a merchandising 
company’s operations are sufficiently separate from those of 
a funeral establishment.  J.A. 1144-45.26 
Moreover, the potential for consumer abuse and fraud 
in any scheme that allows merchants to accept payment for 
goods and services that will not be tendered until some future 
date is painfully obvious.  This is especially true where, as 
here, the date for the vendor’s performance may well be 
decades after accepting payment.  Requiring proceeds 
accepted under such an arrangement to be placed in trust is 
not only logical, but imperative if vulnerable consumers are 
to be protected from the unscrupulous (or financially 
“strapped”) vendor.  Cf. Nat’l Funeral Servs., Inc. v. 
Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136, 143 n.11 (4th Cir. 1989) (relying 
upon attorney solicitation Supreme Court cases to uphold 
West Virginia’s ban on door-to-door and telephone 
solicitation for funeral pre-need contracts and noting that, 
“[i]n both [contexts], an advocate trained in the art of 
persuasion is trying to convince an emotionally vulnerable 
layperson that he needs professional services”).  The 
requirements of the FDL and FIA are reasonable standing 
alone.  The Board’s attempt to resolve the tension between 
                                              
26 Among the factors outlined in a memo authored by then-Board prosecutor 
Kathleen Grossman are:  
[A]re the pre-need sales merchandising 
corporations . . . operated separate and apart 
from the funeral business . . . .?  Are there 
two sets of bookkeeping records kept?  
Separate advertising signs?  Do the 
corporations display signs for public view at 
all?  Which businesses display signs?  Are 
there separate entrances?  How is the 
building set up, i.e., a common vestibule 
leading to separate suites? 
J.A. 1145. 
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those two statutes may be awkward or even strained, but it is 
not unreasonable and it is consistent with Pennsylvania’s 
legitimate public interest.27  Accordingly, we part with the 
District Court’s conclusion that the trust requirement results 
in a constitutional deprivation.  
 
F.  First Amendment 
 
 The Plaintiffs claim that the FDL’s restrictions on commercial speech 
violate the First Amendment.  It is long-settled that the First Amendment 
protects commercial speech.   See Va. Bd. of Pharma. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).  Several arguments are subsumed in the 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, and we will discuss the merits of each of 
these claims in turn. 
 
1.  Restriction on Use of Trade Names 
 
Subject to limited exceptions,28 Section 8 of the FDL requires that 
funeral homes operate under the name of the current funeral director or that of a 
predecessor.  See 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 479.8(a), (b), (d), 479.9(a).29  For 
example, if a hypothetical funeral director named “Jane Smith” purchased the 
“Johnson Funeral Home,” she would only be able to continue to operate the 
establishment under its current name or as the “Smith Funeral Home.”  The 
Plaintiffs claim that this restriction on the use of trade names violates the First 
Amendment. 
a.  Applicability of Central Hudson & Gas Electric Corp.’s 
Test 
 At the outset, the parties dispute whether we should assess the merits of 
the First Amendment claim under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), or whether Friedman v. 
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), controls.  
 
In Friedman, the earlier of these two cases, the Supreme Court upheld a 
Texas law that proscribed the practice of optometry under a trade name.  See 
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 3-4.  The Court distinguished the use of trade names from 
other types of “commercial speech” such as product or service advertisements 
                                              
27 Indeed, although we do not hold that resolution of the tension between the 
100% requirement in the FDL and the 70% requirement in the FIA necessitates 
it, the Commonwealth could rationally have argued that the dangers inherent in 
the deferral of performance that is endemic in pre-need contracts requires that 
100% of the contract price be placed in trust to ensure performance under the 
contract. 
28 Section 9 of the FDL excepts funeral homes owned by “grandfathered” pre-
1935 corporations from this requirement.  63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.9(a). 
 
29 Even in that circumstance, funeral homes owned by a sole proprietor or 
partnership that operate under the name of a predecessor funeral director must 
disclose the name of the current owner in advertising.  Id. § 479.8(a).  Funeral 
homes owned by an RBC or professional (pre-1935) corporation that operate 
under a predecessor’s name must similarly disclose the name of the home’s 
licensed supervisor.  Id. §§ 479.8(b), (d).   
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by explaining that while the latter are “self-contained and explanatory,” a trade 
name will generally have “no intrinsic meaning.”  Id. at 12.  The Court then 
stated that because “ill-defined associations of trade names with price and 
quality information can be manipulated by the users of trade names, there is a 
significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the public.”  Id. at 
12-13.  Given the State’s “substantial” interest in “protecting the public from the 
deceptive and misleading use of [] trade names” and the Court’s conclusion that 
the restriction only had “incidental effect on the content of the commercial 
speech involved,” the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge.  Id. at 
15-16.  Not surprisingly, Pennsylvania urges us to apply Friedman because it is 
more favorable to the State’s position than Central Hudson.  
  
However, Friedman’s applicability and continued viability is not as 
clear as the Commonwealth would have us believe because the Court 
subsequently adopted a more detailed test for limitations on commercial speech 
in Central Hudson.  There, the Court explained that a court considering the 
validity of a restriction on commercial speech must first ask whether the 
commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading.  447 U.S. at 
566.  If the speech is neither, the reviewing court must then determine “whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial.”  Id.  If it is, the third and 
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson inquiry require a court to respectively 
inquire “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted” and whether the regulation is “more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.”  Id. 
  
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has provided additional 
guidance by explaining that—in the professional services context—commercial 
speech that is actually misleading “may be prohibited entirely,” In re R.M.J., 
455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982), while potentially misleading speech may be regulated 
but not entirely curtailed, id. 
  
Although Pennsylvania does not urge us to wholly disregard the 
Central Hudson test, it does suggest that Friedman is sufficiently on point to 
resolve our inquiry in the Commonwealth’s favor and that we should avoid 
parsing through the four prongs of Central Hudson.  The State’s argument goes 
too far.  
  
As noted, Friedman predated the four-part Central Hudson test and the 
latter distinction between commercial speech that is “actually misleading” and 
that which is “potentially misleading.”  See Wine & Spirits Retailers v. Rhode 
Island, 481 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Since its decision in Friedman, the Court 
has made a doctrinal refinement, distinguishing in the professional services 
context between commercial speech that is inherently or actually misleading and 
commercial speech that is only potentially misleading.”).  Accordingly, even 
where Friedman applies, federal courts commonly conduct an analysis within 
the framework of the more “refined” and nuanced test set forth in Central 
Hudson.  See Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(considering Friedman’s applicability to challenge against certain New York 
restrictions on attorney advertising as part of Central Hudson test); Wine & 
Spirits Retailers, 481 F.3d at 8-9 (same).30  Our inquiry will be thus be guided 
by the more recent decision in Central Hudson. 
                                              
30 Thus, the Central Hudson test would not apply if the Commonwealth could 
show that the use of trade names in the funeral industry is either unlawful or 
inherently misleading.  See Wine & Spirits Retailers, 481 F.3d at 8 (“It is not 
always necessary . . . to deal with each of the test’s four parts.  In framing the 
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b.  The Central Hudson Test 
 
As noted, Central Hudson’s threshold requirement is that the regulated 
speech concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Here, there is neither 
evidence nor allegation that the use of trade names in the funeral industry would 
either mask or facilitate illegal activity.  Instead, Pennsylvania heavily relies on 
Friedman to suggest that the use of trade names presents “numerous” 
opportunities for deception of the public—e.g., by keeping a trade name despite 
staff changes and freeing proprietors from relying on their personal reputation to 
attract business. 
 
We agree that Friedman underscored “the significant possibility that 
trade names will be used to mislead the public” in the context of invalidating 
Texas’s ban on trade names in the field of optometry.  Friedman, 440 U.S. at 12.  
However, the Board’s argument ignores the record that the Court’s analysis was 
based on in Friedman.  See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13 (“The concerns of the 
Texas Legislature about the deceptive and misleading uses of optometrical trade 
names were not speculative or hypothetical, but were based on experience in 
Texas with which the legislature was familiar . . . .”).  Indeed, as other courts 
have noted when considering challenges to an across-the-board ban on the use of 
trade names, in Friedman Texas “marshaled substantially strong[] and [] 
specific evidence supporting its prohibition on trade names” in the field of 
optometry.  Alexander, 598 F.3d at 96.  There has been no such showing here.  
  
Moreover, while Friedman provides some support for the 
Commonwealth’s position, the lack of record support for its parade of 
hypothetical horribles suggests caution before concluding that trade names in the 
funeral industry are sufficiently misleading to rest our analysis upon Friedman.  
Instead, we conclude that the assignment of trade names to funeral homes is, at 
best, potentially misleading, and we must therefore consider the remaining 
prongs of the Central Hudson test. 
 
Obviously the Board’s asserted government interest in providing 
accurate information to the public is “substantial.”  See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 
15-16 (noting State’s interest in protecting public from deceptive and misleading 
use of trade names in optometry industry is “substantial and well 
demonstrated”).  However, the FDL’s ban on the use of trade names in the 
funeral industry cannot survive the limitations imposed under Central Hudson.  
Under its requirements, “the government must demonstrate that the challenged 
law ‘alleviates’ the cited harms ‘to a material degree.’”  Pitt News v. Pappert, 
379 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 
618, 624 (1995) (alterations omitted)).   
 
That requirement is inconsistent with a statutory scheme that is fatally 
“underinclusive.”  See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994) 
(“Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation . . . . [m]ay diminish the 
credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first 
place.”); see also Metro Lights, L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898, 905 
(9th Cir. 2009) (“To put it in the context of the Central Hudson test, a regulation 
                                                                                                     
inquiry, the threshold question is whether ‘the commercial speech concerns 
unlawful activity or is misleading.’  If so, the inquiry ends there: ‘the speech is 
not protected by the First Amendment.’” (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. 
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002))).  The Board has not made such a showing. 
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may have exceptions that ‘undermine and counteract’ the interest the 
government claims it adopted the law to further; such a regulation cannot 
‘directly and materially advance its aim.’” (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 
514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995))). 
  
The restrictions on commercial speech here are so flawed that they 
cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny.  Indeed, the District Court correctly 
identified the pivotal problem concerning the FDL’s proscription at Central 
Hudson’s third step: by allowing funeral homes to operate under predecessors’ 
names, the State remains exposed to many of the same threats that it purports to 
remedy through its ban on the use of trade names.  See Heffner, 866 F. Supp. 2d 
at 408.  A funeral director operating a home that has been established in the 
community, and known under his or her predecessor’s name, does not rely on 
his or her own personal reputation to attract business; rather, the predecessor’s 
name and reputation is determinative.  Nor does a funeral home operating under 
a former owner’s name provide transparency or insight into changes in staffing 
that the Board insists is the legitimate interest that the State’s regulation seeks to 
further.  
   
Moreover, unlike in Friedman, there is nothing in the record here to 
even suggest that the use of trade names in the funeral industry has either 
mislead or deceived the public to a greater degree than using a predecessor’s 
name, and the Board does not suggest otherwise.  Thus, we agree with the 
District Court that the FDL’s trade name ban is irrevocably “pierced” by the 
type of “exemptions and inconsistencies” that the Supreme Court has in found 
fatal to First Amendment scrutiny.31  Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1999); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 
514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
424-26 (1993); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989). 
 
2.  Payment on Commissions to Unlicensed Salespeople 
 
 The second issue that the Plaintiffs attack on First Amendment grounds 
concerns the constitutionality of Section 11(a)(8) of the FDL.  In relevant part, 
that section provides that a funeral director or funeral home’s license may be 
suspended if a licensee pays unlicensed employees commissions on sales for 
pre-need funeral arrangements.  See 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 479.11(a)(8).  The 
Board has implemented this restriction by promulgating regulations prohibiting 
payment of “any gratuity” or “valuable consideration” to unlicensed employees.  
In Count XIII of the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, they argue that this 
restriction is unconstitutional because it prohibits anyone but a licensed funeral 
director from communicating with customers about services or merchandise.  
See Walker v. Flitton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 503, 503, 507 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (holding 
that the First Amendment precludes a prohibition on unlicensed employees and 
                                              
31 Because we conclude that the FDL’s proscription on the use of trade names 
does not pass Central Hudson’s third step, we need not discuss the fourth 
“narrow-tailoring” prong.  We note, however, that the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the third and fourth prongs of the test complement each other 
and has observed that the four factors of the analysis are “not entirely discrete.”  
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001); Greater New 
Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc., 527 U.S. at 183, 188; see also Metro Lights, L.L.C., 
551 F.3d at 904 (noting “[i]t has not always been clear how [inquiry into a 
regulation’s ‘fit’] differs with respect to the last two steps of the Central Hudson 
analysis”). 
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agents from interacting with customers).  The Plaintiffs allege that this 
restriction on commissions similarly violates the First Amendment under the 
reasoning in Central Hudson.  We disagree.  
 
 Here again, the Commonwealth’s articulated interest in consumer 
protection is undoubtedly substantial.  “The whole premise behind earning a 
commission is that the amount of sales [] increase[s] the rate of pay.”  Parker v. 
NutriSys., Inc., 620 F.3d 274, 284 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  It is therefore eminently reasonable for a legislature to want to 
protect consumers from dealing directly with salespeople who have a financial 
interest in “upselling” more expensive or unnecessary merchandise and services 
than are appropriate for a given consumer’s situation or resources.  See Walker, 
364 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (recognizing “substantial governmental interest in 
protecting the general public as it relates to the dissemination of information 
regarding, and the purchasing of, preneed funerals.”).   
 
 The potential for this evil to manifest itself in the context of sales 
personnel being rewarded for exploiting the need to afford a loved one a 
“proper” or “respectful” burial or memorial is too obvious to require elaboration.  
Customers looking to purchase funeral arrangements and services are clearly 
among the most vulnerable consumers to be found in any marketplace. 
 
 We therefore have little difficulty in concluding that this restriction 
easily satisfies the third Central Hudson prong.  Section 11(a)(8) “directly and 
materially” advances the State’s asserted interest by removing the financial 
incentive that salespersons would have to oversell pre-need funeral services.    
 
 We realize that the consumer protection afforded by this statutory 
scheme is imperfect.  For example, it still allows salaries or bonuses to be 
influenced by the volume or amount of sales, and this may still incentivize the 
unscrupulous sales person to prey upon the unwary and vulnerable consumer.  
However, this flaw does not suggest that the protection is so under-inclusive that 
it imposes an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.  Salespersons 
in the funeral industry are obviously as entitled to compensation as any other 
sales persons, and any compensatory scheme may favor those who sell more 
goods and/or services than their colleagues.  Perhaps because such realistic 
considerations limit the potential effectiveness of any such scheme, the Supreme 
Court has explained that  “[its] commercial speech cases establish that localities 
may stop short of fully accomplishing their objectives without running afoul of 
the First Amendment.”). Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 442; see also 
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511 (1981) (upholding San 
Diego’s proscription on offsite billboard advertising and rejecting plaintiffs’ 
argument that ban was underinclusive because it did not also cover onsite 
advertising).  We therefore believe that the FDL’s ban on payment of 
commissions to unlicensed sales people is a constitutional remedy that is 
sufficiently tailored to satisfy Central Hudson.32  
                                              
32 The only alternative that would eliminate any room for upselling would be 
mandating a flat compensation for all employees.  Assuming such a scheme 
would be legal, it would prevent businesses from rewarding those employees 
who show extraordinary dedication to their jobs by doing the “little things” that 
employers rarely require but nevertheless expect from employees.  
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G.  Contract Clause 
 
 Finally, the Plaintiffs contend that the Board’s interpretation of the 
FDL’s trust provisions violates the Constitution’s Contract Clause by impairing 
pre-need contracts between the Plaintiffs and their customers. 
 
 The Contract Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”  U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 1.  To 
show a Contract Clause violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a change in 
state law effectively altered a contractual obligation.  Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).  Our Contract Clause inquiry must consider 
“[(1)] whether there is a contractual relationship, [(2)] whether a change in law 
impairs that contractual relationship, and [(3)] whether the impairment is 
substantial.”  Id.  If all three questions are answered affirmatively, we must then 
“inquire whether the law at issue has a legitimate and important public purpose 
and whether the adjustment of the rights to the contractual relationship was 
reasonable and appropriate in light of that purpose.”  Transp. Workers Union 
Local 290 v. SEPTA, 145 F.3d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
 The premise for the Plaintiffs’ Contract Clause 
argument is that the post-PFDA regime, whereby funeral 
directors who receive money in the sale of pre-need 
merchandise may trust funds at the FIA rate of 70% if their 
operations are separate from those of a funeral establishment, 
is not the actual state of the law.  According to the Plaintiffs, 
the Board has recently reversed its stated position and 
currently requires 100% of all pre-need sales of merchandise 
to be held in trust if the corporation selling the goods is 
owned in whole or in part by a licensed funeral director.  The 
Plaintiffs largely base their claim on a regulation that the 
Board proposed in August 2007 but later withdrew and never 
enacted.  See 37 Pa. Bull. 4643, 4646 (Aug. 25, 2007) (“A 
preneed funeral contract may not incorporate a contract for 
funeral merchandise entered into by a person or entity other 
than a funeral director.”). 
 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Board’s proposed interpretation requiring 
100% trust of all funds paid as compensation for pre-need funeral services be 
put in trust impaired the Plaintiffs’ contractual obligations with existing 
consumers.  The Board initially allowed licensed funeral directors to own 
corporations that sold pre-need merchandise as long as those corporations were 
wholly separate from funeral homes.  The Plaintiffs claim that they relied on that 
interpretation only to have their expectations frustrated when the Board 
proposed a regulation banning this practice in August 2007. 
  
The Plaintiffs’ Contract Clause arguments fail as a matter of law for 
two obvious reasons.  First, the Plaintiffs have not even shown that there was a 
change in state law.  Just as we discussed earlier, the Plaintiffs’ articulation of 
the current state of the law in Pennsylvania is based on a proposed regulation 
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that the Board never formally prescribed.  See 37 Pa. Bull. 4643, 4646 (Aug. 25, 
2007).  Indeed, the record shows—and the Plaintiffs concede—that the Board 
withdrew this proposal in December 2009, and it never took effect.  Thus, the 
Plaintiffs have not shown even a threshold action that could be characterized as 
a burden on their contractual obligations with consumers. 
 
Second, even if the Plaintiffs could show that the Board’s proposed 
regulation had the force of law, the Board’s reinterpretation of the FDL would 
not implicate the Contract Clause.  “The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
language of the Contract Clause (i.e., “pass any . . . law”) means that the clause 
applies only to exercises of legislative power.”  Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. 
Schoch, 666 F.3d 862, 874 (3d Cir. 2012).   While the Clause’s application is by 
no means limited to the formal enactments of a State’s legislature,33 “[t]he 
Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Contract Clause is violated 
when there is a new interpretation of an antecedent state statute.”  Id. at 875.   
 
Here, the Plaintiffs accuse the Board of reversing its own interpretation 
and application of longstanding FDL provisions.  Such a reversal is simply not 
the kind of “exercise of legislative authority” that the Contract Clause 
proscribes.  See id. (holding Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s 
interpretation and application of law that had been in force for over 30 years 
“did not exercise legislative authority subject to scrutiny under the Contract 
Clause”). 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court’s judgment 
striking down the FDL’s warrantless inspection scheme on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.  We also reverse the District Court’s judgments concerning the 
Plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause challenges to certain provisions of the 
FDL.  We reverse as well the District Court’s conclusions that the disputed FDL 
provisions violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.  We 
also reverse the District Court’s ruling that the Board’s actions 
unconstitutionally impair the Plaintiffs’ private contractual relations with third 
parties in violation of the Constitution’s Contract Clause.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s ruling that Pennsylvania’s ban on the use of trade names in the 
funeral industry runs afoul of First Amendment protections, but reverse its 
ruling that the ban on the payment of commissions to unlicensed salespeople 
violates the Constitution.  Finally, we remand to the District Court to modify its 
order in accordance with this opinion.  
 
                                              
33 We recently explained that “[t]here is no simple formula for determining 
whether a government act is an exercise of legislative authority.”  Mabey Bridge 
& Shore, Inc., 666 F.3d at 874.  However, Supreme Court cases offer some 
guidance.  A government act will “bear[] the hallmarks of legislative authority 
when it ‘changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied 
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.’”  Id. (quoting Ross v. 
State of Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 163 (1913)).  Conversely, “an act is likely not 
legislative when ‘its purpose was not to prescribe a new law for the future, but 
only to apply to a completed transaction laws which were in force at the time.’”  
Id. (quoting Ross, 227 U.S. at 163). 
